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Introduction and summary
U.S. government spending on foreign affairs will face significant pressures in 
the coming years under almost any scenario. A divisive political environment, 
continuing worries about a sluggish economic recovery, concerns over rising 
budget deficits and national debt, and upcoming elections make it difficult for 
policymakers to reach agreement on budget priorities. That uncertainty will have 
far-reaching consequences. 
This bipartisan report is offered in the spirit of trying to determine how we as a 
nation can make the most efficient and effective use of scarce resources, reform 
our foreign affairs institutions, and defend our core national interests amid such 
major budget uncertainty.  
It is important to underscore the importance and value of the international affairs 
budget in advancing U.S. interests while at the same time conducting reasonable 
contingency planning for the possibility of sharply reduced funding in the near 
and medium term. It is ideal for Congress and the administration to reach a sen-
sible 10-year budget plan that includes both cuts and revenues while protecting 
our core interests both domestically and internationally.  
In that light, it is worth mentioning the recently passed “Ryan Budget” to emerge out 
of the House of Representatives. (This budget plan was issued after the final working 
group meetings were conducted, and so the opinions on it are solely those of the 
authors.) The budget plan would slash some $31.6 billion from 2012 levels out of 
the foreign affairs accounts in just four years. By any reasonable estimation, such an 
approach would decimate our nation’s ability to effectively advance our interests 
overseas, and such budget calculations cannot be justified based on a deliberate 
analysis of our needs and foreign policy priorities as a nation. 
In contrast, we hope that our report can be used to begin a practical conversation 
even as the high-stakes budget battle is waged and allow policymakers to both 
 Introduction and summary | Center for global Development 1
identify areas that require sustained or even increased resources in order to main-
tain U.S. global leadership as well as areas of lesser priority.
The United States is not alone in trying to better balance its approach to interna-
tional affairs at a time of declining resources. A number of our key European allies 
have also reviewed their approach to diplomacy and development in recent years 
in hopes of better focus. 
Central to this challenge is understanding several important developments that 
will shape America’s engagement in the coming years. These mega-trends include 
enormous pressures on the federal budget, continued globalization, the increas-
ingly important role that private philanthropy plays in 
international development, and a likelihood that the major 
state-building exercises of Iraq and Afghanistan over the last 
decade will be a historical anomaly. 
Almost every major study and review of our foreign affairs 
institutions and spending priorities has identified areas of dys-
function and operations that need significant reform. Efforts 
such as the Obama administration’s first-ever Quadrennial 
Diplomacy and Development Review and a Presidential 
Study Directive on Global Development are important steps 
forward on reform. Yet enormous work remains, and the 
executive and legislative branches do not agree on the under-
pinnings of effective international engagement. 
The Center for Global Development and the Center for 
American Progress established the senior-level Working 
Group on Aid Priorities amid Declining Resources to help 
policymakers and concerned citizens set sensible priori-
ties for international affairs spending in the Function 
150 account: the State, Foreign Operations, and Related 
Agencies appropriations bill containing spending on global 
economic, diplomatic, and humanitarian programs by the 
State Department, United States Agency for International 
Development and the Millennium Challenge Corporation 
among others, and food aid accounts in the agriculture 
appropriations bill. 
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Every U.S. president since Harry Truman has seen 
economic and security assistance abroad—which 
made up about 1 percent of the federal budget in 
recent years—as essential to America’s national 
interests even though foreign aid traditionally lacks 
strong defenders in Congress. In fact, Republican 
presidents have overseen the largest increases in 
foreign assistance. To be sure, foreign assistance is an 
imperfect tool, but it also is a core part of America’s 
strategy to increase the number of stable, free-market 
democracies around the world. Such countries make 
better trading partners and better allies, and are an 
abiding source of stability.
Nations need not be aid recipients forever. In the 
1960s nations across Latin America and Asia were 
dismissed as perennial basket cases yet countries 
in both regions combined sensible reforms with a 
jump-start from U.S. assistance programs to achieve 
dynamic, lasting growth. Ten of the 15 largest 
importers of American goods and services, including 
countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, 
graduated from U.S. foreign aid programs according 
to the United States International Trade Commission.1 
Why foreign aid is important
The working group was comprised of a highly bipartisan group of policy experts 
with long experience in Republican and Democratic administrations, Congress, 
nongovernmental organizations, philanthropy, and the private sector. The work-
ing group’s co-chairs, Connie Veillette of the Center for Global Development and 
John Norris of the Center for American Progress, authored the final report based 
on the outcomes of the working group’s deliberations. All opinions in this report 
are those of the co-authors and should not be seen as reflecting the endorse-
ments of the working group members in whole or part. The recommendations 
were developed through consultative meetings, one-on-one interviews, literature 
reviews, and working group deliberations. 
The working group reviewed the entire international affairs budget, which 
encompasses the operations of the State Department, the U.S. Agency for 
International Development and the assistance programs they manage, food 
aid programs, and the programs of many smaller and specialized U.S. agen-
cies. Approximately two-thirds of the 150 account is made up of economic and 
security assistance provided by both the State Department and USAID. (This 
report does not cover aid appropriated by the Department of Defense, though 
the Defense Department delivers some State Department security assistance.) 
Since this is the largest share of the international affairs budget, the core of our 
recommendations center on how to improve this assistance.  
Given the rapid timeframe of this exercise we focused on areas offering the great-
est promise for reform. This report is not a comprehensive review of every single 
activity carried out through the 150 account. We hope to further articulate and 
explore some of the key issues in this report going forward. 
Further, U.S. contributions to multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank 
and the United Nations, represent a vital means for the United States to engage the 
world. They also make an impact on sectors or countries where our bilateral pres-
ence is less influential and represent an important complement to bilateral assistance 
programs. We welcome a closer examination of these multilateral contributions, and 
a number of other donors and organizations have also begun examining where their 
multilateral dollars can best be directed to make the greatest impact.2  
Our work identified four ideas that would fundamentally transform how we con-
duct diplomacy and development. None of these ideas is without controversy, and 
all would require significant change to be instituted. 
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Behind all of our ideas is the belief that America’s approach to diplomacy and 
development requires significant modernization. Our engagement and dol-
lars should be focused where they are going to make a lasting difference, and 
we have often been too slow to recognize and admit where engagement and 
investments have little return. But we also argue strongly for increased, not 
decreased, investments in training our international affairs personnel and feel 
that universal diplomatic representation very much remains in the national 
interest. Working group members agreed that America’s investments in diplo-
macy, development, and international trade are extremely valuable and any 
cuts should not undermine our strategic priorities or values.  We identify bud-
get areas that should be protected.
Here are four ideas that have the greatest potential for effectiveness and transform-
ing how this country engages the world.
Make economic and security assistance more selective
In 2012 the United States is delivering bilateral assistance through the inter-
national affairs account to 146 nations with 103 of these receiving economic 
assistance and 134 receiving security assistance.3 These efforts are far too diffuse, 
undisciplined, and unfocused, and we could achieve much more by concentrating 
economic and security assistance where they will be most effective and curtail-
ing resources where they will not. This idea may sound simplistic, but it would be 
revolutionary in contrast to how aid is currently disbursed. 
Our country-by-country analysis of economic and security assistance included in 
this report was subjective but highly data-informed, taking into consideration a 
country’s commitment to reform, its capacity to achieve lasting development and 
stability, its need, and its strategic importance to the United States. In a limited 
number of cases we argue for priority investments based on immediate conflict 
prevention efforts or to ensure that a country that enjoyed significant postconflict 
investment does not slide backward. We made the data we used for each country 
readily available as part of this report to encourage further debate on these issues. 
(see “Country Profiles” section)
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Bilateral economic assistance
We argue for a major shift away from 103 recipient countries to sustaining or 
increasing investment in 53 core countries over a five-year period. This includes 
increasing investment in 32 high-priority countries and holding funding levels flat 
in 21 countries where there is a continued imperative for engagement but more 
limited expectations. Eighteen countries would graduate from U.S. bilateral eco-
nomic assistance within a five-year period; 11 countries would see their programs 
eliminated because they are small, expensive to operate, or peripheral-interest 
country programs; and 21 poor-performing countries would see economic assis-
tance largely limited to support for democratic and civil-society groups, humani-
tarian relief, and PEPFAR funding. Eleven USAID missions could be closed or 
consolidated as part of this realignment.  
Bilateral security assistance
We argue that aid should be focused on 72 core countries rather than 134 recipi-
ents, with increased investment in 45 high-priority countries and flat funding lev-
els in 27 countries where there is a continued imperative for engagement but more 
limited expectations.  Assistance would be curtailed in 62 countries, including 30 
that should be able to graduate from U.S. security assistance within the next five 
years, 15 where security assistance is relatively small or peripheral to our national 
interest, and 17 we deem to be poor performers.
Transition PEPFAR to country ownership 
The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, or PEPFAR, continues to be 
a very large portion of U.S. international affairs spending. Started by President 
George W. Bush in 2003 to help provide prevention, treatment, and care services 
to countries suffering high HIV/AIDS burdens around the world, the initiative 
represents the largest health commitment ever by one country to combat a single 
disease internationally. 
The Obama administration established PEPFAR Partnership Frameworks—five-
year joint strategic frameworks for cooperation between the U.S. government, 
the partner government, and other partners to combat HIV/AIDS in the host 
country. These partnership frameworks acknowledge that PEPFAR recipient 
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countries need to share much more of the burden moving forward. This created 
some controversy, but sharing costs, particularly with upper-middle-income 
PEPFAR recipients (Botswana, Caribbean Regional, Central America Regional, 
Dominican Republic, Namibia, and South Africa) should be accelerated as part 
of a well-managed and transparent plan that will allow host countries and private 
philanthropy to work together with the United States to keep momentum going in 
the battle against HIV/AIDS. 
This also recognizes that PEPFAR Partnership Frameworks can provide a 
model for how to foster country ownership and transfer financial responsibil-
ity to recipient countries while changing the program itself from an emergency 
humanitarian program to more of a long-term, sustainable, and integrated 
approach to health and development.
Overhaul U.S. food assistance 
A web of outdated laws and regulations—cargo preference, limitations on local 
and regional purchase, and monetization—vastly increase the cost and reduce 
the effectiveness (and timeliness) of our food aid. Food must be purchased in the 
United States and shipped on U.S.-flagged vessels.  Some of the food can then be 
sold on local markets to raise cash that NGOs use for development projects.  
Numerous studies show the inherent inefficiencies of this process. Overhauling 
these restrictions could save taxpayers billions of dollars and make food aid pro-
grams more effective and efficient. Food aid is a classic example of an area where 
smart reforms would make programs work better and save a great deal of money. 
Create an International Affairs Realignment Commission 
Finally, the administration, in consultation with Congress, should appoint a com-
mission to undertake a sorely needed overhaul of our foreign affairs agencies and 
operations based on the very successful model of the Defense Base Realignment 
and Closure Commission, or BRAC. 
Rather than focus on physical installations, as BRAC did, an International Affairs 
Realignment Commission would have the writ to not only look at the physical 
presence of U.S. embassies, consulates, and USAID missions around the globe 
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but more importantly recommend regulations that could be eliminated, programs 
and projects that are no longer necessary, or even institutional consolidation or 
streamlining. In essence, the commission would help shepherd a long-overdue 
rewrite of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the antiquated legislation guiding 
the authorities, use, and allocation of U.S. foreign assistance. 
The president would appoint commissioners in consultation with Congress, and 
the commissioners would base their recommendations on the broad strategic 
guidance established in the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review 
and through subsequent consultations. The president could accept or reject the 
commission’s recommendations in their entirety. If rejected, the commission 
would have a set period to amend and resubmit. The commission’s final report 
would have the force of law if Congress did not reject it.
 Introduction and summary | Center for global Development 7

Trends shaping America’s  
approach to the world
 
 
In looking at how best to reshape America’s international engagement, it is use-
ful to underscore trends that will affect how we conduct foreign affairs in the 
years to come. These trends will shape the resources we will have available for 
foreign affairs while guiding the areas where the United States should focus its 
diplomatic and development efforts. 
Four in particular stand out. 
Funding
This report is driven by an understanding that federal spending on international 
affairs will be under considerable pressure for a number of years and that there con-
tinues to be an unusually high degree of uncertainty in foreign affairs agencies’ bud-
gets. The international affairs baseline budget fell by more than 14 percent between 
2010 and 2012, though this decline is even lower when funds from the Overseas 
Contingency Operations account for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran are included. 
While the president’s 2013 budget shows a slight increase from 2012 levels, 
foreign affairs spending will continue to be under a high degree of scrutiny going 
forward and will often be pitted against cuts in domestic programs. As noted ear-
lier, the House-passed 2013 budget would decimate funding for the foreign affairs 
agencies. While it is not supported by either the Senate or the administration, it 
is equally unlikely that any sitting Republican president would support such deep 
cuts to our foreign affairs architecture.
The Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction’s inability to reach an agreement 
to reduce budget deficits over 10 years will require sequestration—or automatic 
cuts—of funds beginning in 2013 unless Congress and the administration can 
reach a deal before then. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that if seques-
tration goes into force, the resulting across-the-board reduction in discretionary 
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programs such as international affairs would be about 8 percent in 2013. Those 
cuts would cause significant disruptions in our international programs and would 
best be avoided by a sensible bipartisan 10-year agreement to reduce the deficit 
that included both cuts and revenues.4
Securing a deal to avoid sequestration will be highly challenging given the starkly dif-
ferent approaches of the House and Senate. Further, even if an agreement is reached, 
cuts in international affairs are very possible as part of such a deficit reduction pack-
age, even if not on the same scale as those contained within sequestration.  
The reality is that after 10 years of relatively strong growth in international affairs 
spending following September 11, considerable belt-tightening is ahead and 
indeed has already begun. 
We can take lessons from the decline in resources that also occurred in the 1990s 
as policymakers sought a peace dividend from the end of the Cold War. There 
was a high-profile debate about eliminating USAID as an agency and folding its 
surviving functions into the State Department. The effort to eliminate USAID was 
ultimately rebuffed, but from 1990 to 1997, aid funding fell by one-third.  
In hindsight, funding decreases were not well managed, with cuts to USAID’s 
operating expenses far outpacing program decreases. As a result of these fund-
ing cuts, both in operating expenses and to the foreign affairs accounts generally, 
staffing and expertise, especially at USAID, declined precipitously. USAID began 
to look more like a contracting agency than a hub of expertise on development. 
Domestic government agencies filled in some gaps, but this also served to further 
fragment America’s approach to development as more and more federal actors 
played a role in promoting development without a coherent overarching frame-
work and strategy for their efforts. The State Department also took on a greater 
role in development decisions.
As aid programs began to increase in the 2000s—foreign assistance increased 
some 38 percent between 2001 and 2007—USAID found itself short on staff and 
expertise, making it more reliant on using large contracts requiring less hands-on 
management and oversight.  USAID’s lack of resources meant that new pro-
grams—PEPFAR and the Millennium Challenge Account—would not be part 
of its portfolio, further muddying leadership on aid issues. The Department of 
Defense took on greater roles in civilian programs in many conflict and postcon-
flict environments, though its personnel had almost zero training in designing and 
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implementing such programs, leading to repeated and expensive mistakes on the 
ground in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. 
If the United States is to avoid compounding the problems of an already subopti-
mal aid architecture, a far more selective approach to aid makes eminent sense no 
matter what the budget battle outcome is.
Continued globalization 
The fact that the world is increasingly interconnected and interdependent at 
almost every level is not news. Yet, and somewhat ironically, U.S. foreign affairs 
agencies are not always the quickest to come to terms with this. Two points are 
particularly important here. 
First, the recent global financial crisis highlighted the need for strong and account-
able government institutions when dealing with economic shocks that spread rap-
idly from one country to the next. But strengthening government institutions has 
never been a strong suit of the United States or most other donors for that matter. 
This remains something of a blind spot and too many U.S. assistance programs 
continue to focus on micro-level conditions while ignoring the broader conditions 
for development and stability. 
The second part of globalization worth noting is that virtually every community 
across the United States now has an unprecedented web of links, ties, and con-
cerns with other parts of the world. But our foreign affairs institutions are slow to 
embrace and harness the depth of these connections at a time when we desper-
ately need an effective constituency supporting sensible international engagement. 
The rise of private philanthropy
Official government economic assistance is a smaller and smaller portion of the 
overall development engagement the United States provides. U.S. private economic 
engagement with developing countries—a combination of U.S. private philan-
thropic giving and U.S. private capital flows—was $106.7 billion in 2009, $77.9 bil-
lion more than total U.S. official development assistance that year.5 A new generation 
of philanthropists, such as Bill Gates and Warren Buffett, willing to put billions of 
dollars into development has fundamentally altered the landscape. 
 Trends shaping America’s approach to the world | Center for global Development 11
By and large this is an incredibly positive development, and it should allow the 
U.S. government to better focus on areas where its strengths are the greatest. That 
said, it also poses new challenges in coordination, strategy, and approach, and 
both private donors and government officials have much to learn from each other. 
In general, government assistance programs need to be shifted to better dovetail 
with the increasingly important role of private philanthropy and private capital. 
 We should avoid fighting the past war 
The United States dramatically altered many of its diplomatic and develop-
ment practices as a result of massive investments over the last decade in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Pakistan.6 All are deeply troubled engagements and historical 
anomalies, and the United States is unlikely to be engaged in such massive state-
building exercises on a regular basis. This is why it would be a mistake to overly 
focus our diplomacy and development on preparing for the last war—not the next 
one. The International Affairs account needs to be reoriented with an eye toward 
the future, with more of an emphasis on crisis prevention than state rebuilding. 
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Key budget areas  
deserving protection 
 
 
It is vital that we not only identify areas where we can achieve reform and savings 
but also define core interests that deserve absolute protection—and perhaps even 
greater funding—in the budget. 
This paper reflects the views of its two authors, but the working group endorsed 
many core areas. All members agreed that robust diplomatic and development 
capacity are in the national interest and represent tools that the next president, 
whatever his party, will find indispensable. All working group members felt 
strongly that even as specific cuts are identified, it is essential to maintain or 
strengthen a number of priority areas even during a period of budget stress.  
Key areas deserving protection are discussed below.
Universal diplomatic presence
The United States has long tried to maintain diplomatic presence in every coun-
try around the globe. The few exceptions to this rule are the most conflict-torn or 
despot-ridden states where the United States is forced to manage its diplomatic rela-
tions from afar for a relatively short period of time. But maintaining embassies, even 
when they are small offices, entails considerable expense both in keeping up and 
securing the physical embassy or consulate and in related staffing costs and benefits. 
It would be easy to hand-pick a list of countries where it is less than compelling for 
the United States to maintain an embassy. Yet the working group agreed that the 
United States benefits tremendously from universal representation, which under-
scores our willingness and ability to engage with friends, allies, and even foes around 
the world. Ending universal representation would make it far harder to advance 
America’s interests at a time when the interconnection of states is deeper than ever. 
In addition, universal representation is also crucial in looking out for Americans’ 
interests and safety as they work and travel in every corner of the world. 
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Supporting development, democracy, and stability
The strategy behind economic and security assistance programs is compelling: 
The greater the number of stable, free-market democracies around the world, the 
more secure, prosperous, and dynamic our nation becomes. Directly promoting 
sustainable economic development, democratic values, professional civilian-
controlled militaries, and well-functioning civil societies is therefore vital for the 
United States even when foreign affairs spending will be cut. 
There is a robust debate about which assistance programs best achieve these 
goals. But there is broad recognition that lasting development only works when 
the recipient country is genuinely committed to change and growth. The United 
States needs to keep supporting such long-term development efforts, but it needs 
to do a far better job focusing such assistance in those states where it will help spur 
lasting change, as is argued elsewhere in this report. 
Operating expenses 
It is impossible to carry out effective diplomatic and development programs 
without commensurate operating expenses. That may sound self-evident, but in 
previous bouts of budget cutting, Congress showed a tendency to protect funds 
for programs while slashing funds for people who design, oversee, and implement 
such programs. Figure 1 makes clear there is a sharp disconnect between operat-
ing expenses and program funds at USAID. 
The result of keeping operating expenses tightly constrained—even when 
program expenses are expanding—is to leave USAID as little more than a con-
tracting agency with less and less expertise and knowledge about how develop-
ment programs should be designed and where they could best be conducted to 
advance the national interest. 
The compulsion to cut operating expenses while protecting program funds is 
understandable. It is easier for policymakers to cut budgets for staff than to cut 
programs that combat malaria, promote economic growth, or deliver humanitar-
ian assistance. But the last decade clearly taught us that development works best 
when it is conducted with good partners committed to reform and their own 
people. Funding programs without the expertise to manage them is a recipe for 
wasted money, a lack of accountability, and programs increasingly divorced from 
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FIGURE 1
Cutting the workforce but not the programs
USAID foreign service permanent workforce and USAID managed program dollars, 1970-2012 
(inflation adjusted 2008 dollars)
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USAID’s permanent Foreign Service workforce declined 58% from 1970. Source: United States Agency for International Development
practical reality. This report spells out areas where a more selective approach to 
investments could also achieve considerable operating expense savings.
Crisis prevention
Recent institutional reviews such as the Quadrennial Diplomacy and 
Development Review focused on improving the United States’ capacity to prevent 
crises before they erupt. But foreign affairs agencies need to do more. 
Getting the agencies more adroit at crisis prevention will require significant invest-
ments in continued and new training for personnel and a reshaping of the institu-
tional ethos at the foreign affairs agencies, which are risk averse. Preventing crises 
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requires sensible funding, strong field-driven analysis, a willingness to intervene at 
key moments, and a broad understanding of the institutional levers, pressures, and 
incentives that can be brought to bear on a potential crisis situation. 
It is welcome that crisis prevention is a key goal for our foreign policy establish-
ment on a rhetorical level. Translating that rhetoric into reality, however, will 
require dynamic leadership and sustained investments at a time when even tradi-
tional program areas are coming under the knife.     
We now move to our recommendations for reform.
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Reform 1: Make bilateral economic 
and security assistance more selective
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Presidential candidates throughout U.S. history have often been quick to criticize 
U.S. economic and security assistance abroad. Yet every single president since 
World War II, once in office, defended assistance programs for one simple reason: 
They are an essential tool of U.S. foreign policy. Equally, no president advocated 
reducing the U.S. diplomatic presence. As long as the United States remains a 
global leader, its president will rely on diplomacy and development to help pro-
mote a world in which U.S. interests and ideals can thrive.  
Whoever occupies the Oval Office in 2013 will have to employ both diplomatic 
and development tools for the United States to maintain its global leadership. But 
both tools need sharpening regardless of budget dynamics.
This approach for reforming economic and security assistance is based on 
several principles: 
•	 Our assistance programs should be structured to reward and strengthen 
countries that are reform-minded, good allies, open to business, and willing to 
make hard choices to advance their own people. We should look at all of our 
economic and security assistance programs as investments in creating the next 
generation of donors and trade partners. 
•	 Working in fewer countries will allow us to increase investments in those making 
promising reforms so that our aid makes a difference and helps cement lasting change. 
And our considerable investment in multilateral institutions lessens the need for our 
bilateral assistance programs to be active in such a large number of countries.7
•	 Aid programs that are inefficient, ineffective, outdated, or better carried 
out by other partners should be ended. Poorly performing countries—those 
unwilling to implement economic growth reforms or that reject principles of good 
governance and human rights—are not good investments for economic assistance 
and should only receive security assistance when there is a compelling reason.
•	 Assistance programs should focus on sectors in which the U.S. has a compara-
tive advantage over other donors. It is important to recognize what the U.S. does 
well, is more capable of doing than others, and should continue doing. We believe 
these areas of comparative advantage are humanitarian assistance, global health, 
and food security. Cost savings that we identify in this report could equally be 
used to focus on these areas, or to contribute to reducing budget deficits. 
•	 The United States can only maintain its leadership position and stabilize its 
budget by more effectively and selectively using diplomacy and development. 
It cannot, nor should it, rely primarily on the Defense Department to project 
U.S. influence and power.
While we believe in a universal diplomatic presence, we do not endorse universal 
economic and security assistance. U.S. foreign assistance programs are too disbursed 
across countries and sectors to be truly effective. Aid allocations are often made in 
ways that result in doing a little bit here and there in an effort to curry small mea-
sures of diplomatic favor. Sector choices are often allocated not by what we do well, 
but as an effort to placate key actors in Congress and the aid community.  
As of fiscal year 2012 the United States provides economic assistance to 146 coun-
tries, with 103 of these receiving economic assistance and 134 receiving security 
assistance. This means every country on earth has roughly a 75 percent chance of 
receiving U.S. economic or security assistance, which only underscores the undis-
ciplined nature of the aid portfolio. 
Of total economic assistance allocated in fiscal year 2012, one country, 
Afghanistan, consumes roughly 15 percent of U.S. economic assistance. The top 
10 recipients represent about 50 percent of total bilateral aid. The remaining 50 
percent is allocated among 93 countries, some receiving as little as $492,000.
Selective economic assistance
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Principles to guide more focused and selective U.S. economic assistance 
Squaring two compelling needs—achieving cost savings and maintaining effec-
tive U.S. global engagement—may seem at odds, but as long as we concentrate 
our resources where they are likely to be most effective and reduce them where 
they are not, we can achieve both. 
The President’s Policy Directive on Global Development, which studied the role 
of U.S. economic assistance, called for greater focus and selectivity in delivering 
economic assistance, which we define here as the following 150 bilateral accounts: 
Development Assistance; Global Health Programs; Economic Support Fund; 
Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia; and the nonemergency portions 
of the Food for Peace account. The administration advocates a more selective 
approach for these programs, but progress—as reflected in the 2012 and 2013 
budgets—is limited. Aid programs were eliminated in only five countries in 2012, 
but none are zeroed out in 2013.
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Congress and the White House often differ on foreign policy and spending priorities, and these differences are regu-
larly reflected in the annual appropriations bill for the State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Agencies. 
As Congress increasingly has been unable to pass foreign policy authorizing legislation, it has come to rely almost 
exclusively on its critical role in the appropriations process to assert congressional preferences and to influence policy.  
A casual review of any recent State-Foreign Operations bill shows that the bills now include more policy directives 
than spending. A 2011 study calculated that Congress included specific country and sector directives for 66.5 per-
cent of total bilateral economic assistance in the 2010 bill.  Just 3 percent of the Economic Support Fund was left to 
the discretion of the secretary of state.
When Congress includes directives at the country and sector level, it makes it more difficult for any administra-
tion to respond flexibly and to adjust its approach to changes in conditions on the ground. The Arab Spring is only 
one recent example where increased flexibility could have improved the U.S. response. USAID missions are often 
forced to engage in extended contortions to make their country programs match up with congressional directives 
dictated from thousands of miles away. And sector earmarks—whether for programs in water, agriculture, micro-
finance, or other issues—run counter to the concept of designing development approaches in shared partnership 
with the host country and holding the host country accountable for results. 
Congress moved in 2011 to reduce the number of earmarks and change requirements to recommendations, using 
“soft” earmarks rather than “hard” ones. Soft earmarks are statements of preferred policy and approaches rather 
than directives. Yet some appropriators quickly expressed frustration that the administration did not treat all of 
their requests as directives.  
In short, Congress still needs to move further away from micro-managing the foreign assistance accounts. At the 
same time, administrations need to do a better job of communicating with the Hill and engaging Congress in a 
genuine dialogue on policy approaches. 
Congress as policy activist or micro-manager?
Managing international programs in the face of anticipated deep budget cuts can 
be approached in two ways: a reduction in all programs and country allocations 
or a major reorientation of approach and focus. The former would spread the pain 
evenly but most certainly dilute effectiveness. Good programs and priority coun-
tries would face the same cuts as bad programs and partners of lesser importance. 
And such an approach certainly would not accomplish high-impact development 
while perpetuating a major weakness of the U.S. approach: trying to do too much 
in too many places with limited effect. 
The alternative—a major reorientation—is politically challenging. But making 
our aid programs more selective and focused would make them far more effec-
tive and better-positioned to achieve the changes that best serve our national 
interests. We should concentrate on effectiveness while maintaining the U.S. 
commitment to be a world leader. 
It should be noted that achieving greater selectivity where aid is provided and greater 
focus on programmatic comparative advantage will be impossible if Congress con-
tinues to heavily earmark funds at the country and sector level. Earmarks, with their 
associated requirements to notify Congress in order to reprogram funds, greatly 
reduce flexibility and responsiveness and ultimately undermine aid effectiveness.
The following are recommendations to better guide budgeting around 
selectivity and focus.
Be clear on why aid is provided and when it will end
Incorporate benchmarks into development strategies. The United States does 
not have exit strategies for its economic and security assistance programs. It is 
indeed difficult to end aid allocations to longtime recipients even when countries 
are clearly ready to transition off aid. Perversely, many in government feel that 
ending assistance sends a negative message about the bilateral relationship rather 
than signaling the enormous progress made on the ground. 
Having a plan with clear benchmarks and goals would allow both Washington 
and assistance recipients to focus on what needs to be accomplished rather than 
simply judging the U.S. commitment by aid funding levels. When the country 
meets its goals, the withdrawal of aid demonstrates that the aid was successful 
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and U.S. engagement should evolve into other areas like trade and commerce. The 
benchmarks should be clearly identifiable and measurable, and comport with the 
principle of country ownership, developed jointly with the recipient country.
Delineate development and diplomacy. Development and diplomacy are power-
ful tools of U.S. global engagement. They should be complementary but distinct. 
As they have become conflated, it is more difficult to end programs that are under-
performing or are no longer necessary.  
The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review’s use of the term “develop-
ment diplomacy” is a case in point. This turn of phrase—which conveys the view that 
development is a tool of diplomacy rather than a tool of U.S. foreign policy—makes it 
much harder to be selective about where we direct both economic and security assis-
tance. Almost every diplomat wants to maintain an aid program in the country where 
they are posted, feeling that it will buy good will. But we need a far more strategic 
approach where leadership in Washington, in consultation with State and USAID offi-
cers in the field, directs aid to those select locales where it will really make a difference. 
USAID shows a greater, albeit still limited, willingness to end aid programs and 
close missions than State. American diplomats need to be sufficiently talented that 
they can represent our national interests in a foreign capital—even if that country 
no longer seems like a wise place to put increasingly scarce aid dollars. 
At the same time, diplomacy can be used to advance development, especially 
when development hinges on changes in government policies—which is often 
the case. These are opportunities to amplify forms of U.S. engagement and should 
become hallmarks of the relationship between development and diplomacy.
Create a State Department strategic fund. In some countries assistance for 
purely diplomatic reasons is justified, such as in a country that is a poor develop-
ment partner but plays a key role in combating terrorism. In these cases the State 
Department should have a separate aid account. The current Economic Support 
Fund, or ESF, is co-managed by State and USAID and, while its funds can support 
development activities, its primary purpose is not development. ESF was created 
to support strategically important countries that might not otherwise qualify for 
aid. This distinction has been lost as ESF has become a general pot of funds given 
regardless of whether a country receives other economic assistance. Over time 
many countries have received both ESF and development assistance. 
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The ESF fund should be eliminated and replaced with a State Department account 
for strategic countries. Current ESF funds used for development activities should be 
transferred to the Development Assistance account with the remaining funds con-
stituting the new State fund.8 The new fund should be allocated by country to cover 
increased amounts for the current Ambassador Funds, with ambassadors making the 
key recommendations on how best to use those funds to accomplish U.S. objectives.9
Focus on U.S. comparative advantage: Health, food security, and 
humanitarian assistance
Almost every observer of U.S. aid programs believes they lack focus, and there is 
nary an activity in which the United States does not have a program. This is why the 
administration and Congress must jointly provide leadership focusing bilateral pro-
grams where there is a comparative advantage. Cost savings identified in this report 
could be used to further strengthen U.S. programs. 
We identify health, food security, and humanitarian 
assistance as areas in which the United States has 
considerable resources, experience, and expertise. 
They should form the foundation of sector pro-
grams. Further, U.S. aid programs should work in 
no more than three sectors in each country to more 
effectively focus resources. We do not believe this 
approach devalues the principle of country owner-
ship but instead puts U.S. resources where they will 
have the greatest impact.
Health is a global public good from which all 
nations benefit, and the United States is a long-
standing leader in health including disease research, 
technology, pharmaceuticals, and general medical 
sciences. It has increased health aid in the inter-
national affairs budget nearly six-fold, from $1.38 
billion in 2001 to $7.85 billion in 2011. In some 
recipient countries it dwarfs the assistance other 
donors provide. The Global Health Initiative, an 
Obama effort to integrate PEPFAR and other 
health programs under a more holistic umbrella, 
The Millennium Challenge Corporation is a leader in part-
nering with countries around the principle of country 
ownership. It has also taken on work in key sectors, such as 
infrastructure, that other U.S. agencies have largely aban-
doned. Initially designed to work with countries poised to 
make significant gains in economic growth, it has selected a 
range of aid partners along the income spectrum with some 
compact countries decades away from aid graduation. 
The MCC model is a good complement to a redesigned U.S. 
aid system and should continue. But it should rethink its 
compact partners and focus on helping countries graduate 
completely from U.S. economic assistance.  
Further, if the president’s 2013 budget request is approved, 
MCC funding will have remained at $898 million for three 
straight years—quite a distance from the $5 billion President 
George W. Bush promised. At this level the MCC will need to 
be even more selective about compact partners.
The Millennium Challenge Corporation
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has enjoyed bipartisan support. In addition, U.S. private philanthropy is deeply 
involved in the health sector and both U.S. public- and private-sector involvement 
is sensible, and allows for greater cumulative impact in the long run. 
Promoting global food security is also a U.S. prior-
ity consistent with its historical leadership in this 
field. A growing global population projected to 
reach around 9 billion in 2050,10 changing diets that 
require increased agricultural inputs, volatility in 
fuel prices, and the uncertainty of climate change all 
contribute to the need to increase production, sta-
bilize prices, and do so in a sustainable fashion. The 
United States enjoys an elaborate network of agricul-
tural universities, research institutions, and private-
sector entities that bring a wide range of expertise 
to bear on hunger and promoting lasting economic 
growth through food security.
Equally, the United States excels in responding to 
humanitarian disasters whether natural or manmade. 
Humanitarian assistance should remain at the fore-
front of aid efforts given the U.S. military’s reach and 
capacity, the generosity of the American people, and 
the potential for building goodwill. The United States 
is generous in providing such assistance and is also 
exceptionally good at it—in no small part because 
emergency assistance programs are largely spared 
the thicket of bureaucratic regulations that often bog 
down development programs. The American public 
deeply supports such humanitarian programs, and they reflect our faith and belief 
that we can assist the least fortunate in their moment of need.
And while we see health, food security, and humanitarian relief as our greatest 
comparative advantages, this does not mean that none of these areas should be 
improved, as is discussed later with regard to food aid programs and PEPFAR.
Economic growth has been and should remain a U.S. priority. If the ranks of 
the impoverished are to be significantly reduced, it will come through growth. 
But economic growth continues to be an elusive goal for many countries with 
Suggesting that our greatest comparative advantage 
for bilateral assistance is in health, food security, and 
humanitarian assistance needs to be taken in context. We are 
saying that these three areas should be the greatest focus 
for bilateral economic assistance funding. The environment, 
education, microenterprise, democracy activities, or a host of 
other activities are not unimportant. 
We remain committed and influential in these sectors through 
our bilateral aid and also by contributions to multilateral 
agencies such as the Global Environmental Facility and the 
Global Partnership for Education. And as the United States 
consolidates its foreign assistance portfolio, it should consider 
channeling more funds through multilateral organizations to 
maintain these commitments and to do so more effectively.11
Bottom line: We are urging fewer activities in fewer 
countries, with much sharper lines drawn between what 
we are trying to achieve through bilateral assistance, 
multilateral institutions, and work that could be better 
supported by other donors or institutions.
What about other sectors?
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disagreements among donors and partner countries on the assortment of 
interventions that will enable it.
We are not challenging the goal of economic growth in identifying health, food secu-
rity, and humanitarian assistance as areas of U.S. comparative advantage. Rather we 
find these three areas are fields where the United States has the resources, experience, 
and expertise to contribute to economic growth.
Use data to make decisions about aid 
The link between aid allocation and a recipient coun-
try’s need and capacity is often weak because political 
dynamics and budget process inertia influence aid 
decisions. Like an old ship with too many barnacles, 
aid budgets are not thoroughly scrubbed from year 
to year or even decade to decade. New programs are 
started even as outdated ones linger on past their pur-
pose. Country allocations are adjusted up or down 
based on last year’s level. Unless a major event is 
occurring, such as the Arab Spring, adjustments are 
often largely perfunctory.  
Clearly the list of countries receiving U.S. economic 
assistance needs a much more effective scrub than it 
has been given to date, and that review needs to be 
data-informed while still recognizing political and 
security imperatives.  
Recent administration attempts to be more selective 
are uneven. The 2012 budget eliminated develop-
ment assistance to five countries and closed three 
missions. The 2013 request reduces funding to a 
number of countries, mostly in PEPFAR bilateral 
funds, but there is little evidence that those cuts 
reflect a systematic assessment of country need or 
capacity.12 And no USAID mission closures were 
proposed as part of the 2013 budget request. 
In our country-by-country analysis of where we should direct 
economic and security assistance, we weighed a series of data 
and factors on the recipient country’s political climate, busi-
ness environment, need, willingness to tackle corruption, and 
amount of aid and investment received from other sources. 
We considered the following indicators against a country’s 
current assistance level: gross national income per capita 
2010; Freedom in the World freedom status 2011; Human 
Development Index 2011 rank; Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index 2011; Doing Business Index 
2012; population living on less than $2 per day; Worldwide 
Governance Indicators Rule of Law percentile rank 2010; WGI 
Government Effectiveness percentile rank 2010; net official 
development assistance per capita; net foreign direct invest-
ment; and military expenditure as a percent of GDP.15 
In addition, we included a broad range of more subjective 
considerations, including short- and long-term strategic 
interests, political support, and the traditional strength of the 
bilateral relationship. 
No one indicator, piece of data, or piece of political intel-
ligence is sufficient for a wide-angle view, but these indica-
tors provide enough insight on need and capacity to make 
informed decisions through a process that is data-informed 
without being mechanistic. The outcome is a categorization 
of countries that sheds light on where aid should be focused 
because it has a greater probability for success and impact, 
where aid is likely necessary but may yield limited results, and 
where aid is probably not a wise investment.  
The factors we weighed 
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In general, funding was reduced, sometimes dramatically, in a number of countries to 
allow for the creation of a fund to meet the needs of the Arab Spring and to allow for 
debt reduction for Sudan. But these cuts were often across the board and not focused.
Many international donors are also reexamining their programs during this period 
of budget austerity and greater concern for effective aid. Several donors scaled 
back aid recipients and sectors. Still others decided to pull out of or greatly reduce 
their presence in middle-income countries.13  
Doing so presents a moral dilemma. While these countries may be growing, some 
still have sizeable impoverished populations.14 Instead of rewarding them for imple-
menting good policies and making their own commitment to development, some 
donors are cutting off assistance that could be counterproductive. At the same time 
it is myopic to continue aid without recognizing these countries’ growing ability to 
take on more responsibility for their own development. Rather, a country’s income 
should guide the type and focus of aid, putting some on a steeper path to transition 
from aid and a reoriented relationship outside of an aid framework.
What follows is our selection of countries into two broad categories: continued or 
expanded assistance, and curtailed assistance. There is room for healthy debate on our 
selections, and they were often debated at length as we put the report together.  We 
offer this as an illustrative approach in the hope that it leads to a more informed dis-
cussion of resource allocation and a sharper debate about where our aid dollars work.
Continued or expanded economic assistance
Selectivity and focus, as called for in the President’s Policy Directive on Global 
Development, means scaling back the number of recipients and refocusing 
resources for greater impact. As a result, even as aid to some countries is reduced 
or phased out, there may be good reasons to expand aid elsewhere in a more 
focused manner. A number of countries in the continued or expanded assistance 
category could graduate from U.S. assistance within 5 to 10 years.
Within this category we identify priority investment countries and those for 
which we have limited expectations.
Priority investment countries are the highest priority for economic assistance 
because they exhibit both need and a capacity and commitment to develop-
ment. Some are also included because of their strategic importance to the United 
States, but they still demonstrate a reasonable capacity to benefit from assistance. 
Reform 1: Make bilateral economic and security assistance more selective | Center for global Development 25
In some cases we argue for investments based on immediate conflict prevention 
efforts or to ensure a country that enjoyed significant previous postconflict invest-
ments does not slide backward. 
The 32 priority investment countries by region include:
Priority investment countries
Africa
Benin; Burkina Faso; Cote d’Ivoire; Ghana; Kenya; Lesotho; Liberia; Mali*; 
Mozambique; Senegal; Sierra Leone; South Sudan; Tanzania; Zambia
East Asia and the Pacific Burma; Indonesia; Mongolia; Philippines
Europe and Eurasia Georgia; Macedonia; Moldova
Near East Lebanon; Tunisia; West Bank and Gaza
South and Central Asia Bangladesh; Kyrgyz Republic; Nepal
Western Hemisphere Dominican Republic; El Salvador; Guatemala; Honduras; Peru
*We made this categorization prior to an attempted coup and military seizure of power in Mali. The lack of a democratically elected leader 
would affect our categorization of Mali and its associated funding levels.  
Countries for which we have limited expectations will likely continue to receive 
significant assistance largely based on short-term imperatives including security 
and other geopolitical concerns but where there are red flags with the bilateral 
relationship or the behavior of the recipient country’s government. This assistance 
will probably not drive development, given the poor supporting environment on 
the ground, and we do not recommend increased assistance to these countries 
until conditions change. Rather development assistance could be replaced by a 
new State Department strategic fund, as we suggested earlier.
In this section we propose countries that should be given expanded assistance, 
those whose assistance should be kept level, and those whose assistance can be 
constrained. Importantly, these judgments are based on their current and requested 
levels of funding. So by saying that Benin is a priority investment country and that 
we have limited expectations for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, we are not 
saying that Benin is more important than the Democratic Republic of the Congo or 
should receive more funding than the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We are 
arguing that based on current funding trends, conditions on the ground, and the 
likelihood of assistance being effective, Benin’s relatively small allocation could be 
larger while Nigeria’s considerable funding deserves to be kept flat.    
More about our methodology
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The 21 limited expectation countries by region include: 
Limited expectation countries
Africa
Burundi; Democratic Republic of Congo; Ethiopia; Guinea; Malawi; Niger; 
Rwanda; Uganda; Zimbabwe
East Asia and the Pacific None
Europe and Eurasia Kosovo; Ukraine
Near East Egypt; Iraq; Jordan; Yemen
South and Central Asia Kazakhstan
Western Hemisphere Bolivia; Cuba; Ecuador; Haiti; Mexico
Curtailed assistance 
Within this category we identify countries that can be put on a one- to five-year 
aid graduation trajectory, countries with small or expensive-to-operate programs, 
and poor performing countries.
The graduate in one to five years category includes countries that are well posi-
tioned to graduate from U.S. assistance in the near to medium term based on 
declining need and growing capacity. In some cases this would be a more expedi-
tious cessation of aid while in others it would be more gradual. In either case the 
relationship should transition from one largely based on aid to that of trade and 
other areas of cooperation. For emerging donors this may mean exploring some 
trilateral cooperation activities. 
The 18 countries we rank as graduating in one to five years by region include: 
Graduate in one to five years countries
Africa Botswana; Namibia; Nigeria; South Africa
East Asia and the Pacific China; Thailand
Europe and Eurasia
Albania; Armenia; Cyprus; Ireland (International Fund); Montenegro; 
Poland; Russia
Near East None
South and Central Asia India; Sri Lanka
Western Hemisphere Barbados and Eastern Caribbean; Brazil; Colombia
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In a number of countries, aid programs are too small to have much effect, con-
ducted in nations where our interests are largely peripheral, or too expensive to 
operate given their size (see the next section on eliminating small and outdated 
programs and closing and consolidating missions for a discussion on mission 
closure). Some countries in this category should have their aid reduced while 
others should see it managed from a regional mission with a de minimus country 
presence. Inclusion in this category is not a commentary on a country’s general 
willingness to reform but speaks more directly to making focused investments that 
will affect a large number of people. 
The 11 countries in the small, expensive-to-operate, or peripheral-interest country 
programs by region include:  
Small, expensive-to-operate,  
or peripheral-interest country programs
Africa None
East Asia and the Pacific Laos; Marshall Islands; Micronesia; Papua New Guinea; Timor-Leste
Europe and Eurasia Bosnia and Herzegovina; Serbia
Near East Morocco
South and Central Asia None
Western Hemisphere Guyana; Jamaica; Paraguay
 
Poor performing countries do not strike us as good development partners, 
because of poor governance, corruption, or an absence of a commitment to 
development. In this period of limited resources, U.S. aid dollars could be better 
spent elsewhere. Generally humanitarian aid and assistance to democratic and 
civil society groups are more appropriate in these countries. PEPFAR funding 
should also be continued. In some cases, the private sector could take over eco-
nomic aid until the government shows a greater willingness to partner with the 
United States in a development relationship. Other countries could benefit from 
State’s strategic fund. Pakistan and Afghanistan, both special cases with high 
strategic interest but numerous governance issues, should see reductions until 
relations get on more solid footing.
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The following are the 21 countries we rank as poor performing countries by region: 
   Poor performing countries
Africa
Angola; Cameroon; Chad; Djibouti; Madagascar; Mauritania; Somalia; 
Sudan; Swaziland
East Asia and the Pacific Cambodia; Vietnam
Europe and Eurasia Azerbaijan; Belarus
Near East None, with caveats
South and Central Asia Afghanistan; Maldives; Pakistan; Tajikistan; Turkmenistan; Uzbekistan
Western Hemisphere Nicaragua; Venezuela
 
Eliminate small and outdated programs and close and consolidate missions  
End outdated programs. Some programs have outlived their purpose. An exam-
ple: The Assistance to Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia, or AEECA, account 
encompassed two earlier post-Cold War aid accounts for Eastern Europe and 
former Soviet republics. As of 2012 it includes funding of $627 million for 22 
countries, many of which have attained middle-income status. 
The president’s 2013 request would eliminate AEECA, but it does not produce 
considerable savings. Instead AEECA’s funding is reduced by just 18 percent 
and the remaining funds are transferred to other accounts such as the Economic 
Support Fund, the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 
account, and the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related 
Programs account. As noted in the previous section, many AEECA countries 
could have their assistance ended in the near to medium term. Some countries of 
strategic interest can have programs funded through State’s strategic fund.   
Other small and outdated programs, including the International Fund for Ireland 
and Assistance to Schools and Hospitals Abroad, are largely conducted in coun-
tries that are very well off, and should be eliminated. 
Close and consolidate missions. Eliminating small programs goes hand in hand 
with closing and consolidating missions. According to the FY 2013 request, 19 
USAID missions had administrative costs exceeding 15 percent of the value of 
aid provided.16 Countries with missions above this threshold warrant further 
scrutiny to ensure cost effectiveness. USAID program funding in these countries 
should either be increased in the case of priority countries or the mission 
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should be closed or consolidated in the case of graduate and peripheral interest 
countries. In some regions such as Eastern Europe and Latin America, aid dollars 
have declined but staffing levels appear to not have followed suit. A number of 
aid missions in these regions can be closed and if necessary consolidated into a 
regional office. In many cases it may be worthwhile to replace full aid missions 
with a development attaché or counselor.
Closing missions has immediate costs including ending leases and terminating the 
employment of Foreign Service nationals. These costs are temporary and extraordi-
nary. As such they should be included in a separate account for this specific purpose.
Under our review the following 11 missions could be considered for closure over 
the next five years: Albania, Angola, Brazil, Djibouti, Jamaica, Morocco, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay, Serbia, Sri Lanka, and Timor-Leste. 
Develop trilateral cooperation with emerging donors  
Several middle-income aid recipients have started assistance programs of their 
own in south-to-south cooperation. Notable examples include India, South Africa, 
and to a lesser extent Brazil, all of whom receive U.S. economic assistance but 
are also donor nations themselves. As discussed elsewhere in this report, these 
countries are in a position to take over more of the programs the United States 
currently funds. At the same time it would be wise for the United States to stay 
engaged with them as emerging donors.
One way to do this is through trilateral cooperation, in which a donor country, an 
emerging donor, and a developing country work together. This offers many oppor-
tunities to improve effectiveness and reduce costs. It can be used to leverage fund-
ing from emerging donors, capitalize on existing partnerships, and take advantage 
of regional expertise. It can also help emerging donors develop aid approaches 
that conform to best practices and Paris/Accra/Busan principles, especially coun-
try ownership, transparency, and local capacity building.17
Economic assistance to India, South Africa, and Brazil through the development 
assistance account totals $156.1 million. PEPFAR funding, which all three receive, 
is discussed in another section of this report. As aid funding is reduced, missions 
in each could be scaled back accordingly, or closed and replaced with a develop-
ment attaché, a USAID official attached to the U.S. embassy or embedded in the 
host country’s aid agency.
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Selective security assistance
U.S. security assistance, like economic aid, should be better focused around clear 
objectives and directed toward countries where it can make a lasting difference. 
For the purposes of this report, we define security assistance as Foreign Military 
Financing; International Military Education and Training; Nonproliferation, Anti-
terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; International Narcotics Control and 
Law Enforcement; Peacekeeping Operations; and Pakistan Counterinsurgency 
Capability Fund accounts as provided in the State and Foreign Operations 
appropriations bill. The State Department oversees this assistance, though the 
Defense Department carries out the actual provision of some of this aid and 
training. This report does not include military assistance budgeted purely through 
the Pentagon because it is not a component of the 150 account.
The United States provides security assistance for a variety of purposes and in 
different political environments: training security forces, financing military equip-
ment, working with law enforcement on the illegal narcotics trade, and cooper-
ating on nonproliferation issues. In a large number of cases, aid is provided to 
improve military-to-military contacts.
Yet too often we provide security assistance without a sensible discussion of its 
merits. This occurs for two reasons. 
First, the State Department, though formally in charge of overseeing this portfolio, 
does not invest in the human capital and training to ensure it has the expertise 
to do this job properly. As a result, State Department approval and authorization 
of security assistance through these accounts is often pro forma. This, combined 
with a general congressional tendency to ignore scrutiny of anything broadly 
defined as defense, means that our security assistance programs and their respec-
tive goals, accomplishments, and shortcomings receive very little oversight. 
Second, foreign militaries and the security assistance to those militaries are not 
examined with the country’s governance in mind. Far too often governance is 
treated as an afterthought in providing security aid. Also, hard questions about 
whether such assistance will really help improve governance are too often not 
considered except perfunctorily.
Yes, having military-to-military contacts that are enhanced by U.S. military 
training is often useful and can build important relations and some measures 
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of lasting trust. But it is equally true that the U.S. taxpayer should not be 
underwriting security assistance to a country whose leadership is openly despotic 
or to nations of little or no strategic significance. Security assistance will be money 
poorly spent if a recipient country is wildly corrupt, undemocratic, or unwilling to 
embrace even the most basic reforms toward free markets and free government. 
In short, security assistance should not escape scrutiny given the push for greater 
budget austerity. And, similar to economic assistance, we argue that security assis-
tance is spread too thinly across too many countries. It would be far more effective if 
concentrated in high-performing countries and key strategic concerns while reduced 
in more peripheral nations that have proven themselves 
poor partners. Selectivity has not been the byword of the 
U.S. government approach to date: In 2012, 134 countries 
received security assistance through the 150 account. 
We applied a similar selectivity process to security assis-
tance as to economic aid, identifying where aid should 
be maintained or expanded and where it may be limited 
or outdated. Some countries represent greater security 
challenges and significance to U.S. national interests than 
others. And in times of budget austerity, it is important to 
focus on where assistance will have the greatest impact.
In many cases, but certainly not all, countries that are 
good partners on the development front are also places 
where we should be strengthening the host country’s 
military capacity and professionalization. This also makes 
it more likely that countries will graduate completely 
from the need for security and economic aid over time. 
The two sides of the aid ledger are often related. 
Development rarely works amid instability and conflict, 
and assistance that professionalizes security forces can 
contribute to better governance. Better governments, sup-
ported by economic assistance, are also far more likely to 
be dependable and stable security partners over time.
What follows is our selection of countries into two 
broad categories: continued or expanded assistance, 
One hundred and twenty-six countries received 
International Military Education and Training, or IMET, in 
fiscal year 2012. The program seeks to professionalize for-
eign militaries and to strengthen military-to-military ties.  
While the 2013 budget request shows a $3 million decline, 
only one nation—Guinea-Bissau—is zeroed out. What’s 
more, wealthier nations such as Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, 
Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey also receive IMET 
grants even though they are quite capable of covering the 
training costs of their military personnel.  
Countries remain on the IMET list for a simple reason: It 
makes them eligible for reduced rates on education and 
training associated with the Foreign Military Sales and 
IMET programs. (The Foreign Military Sales program is 
the United States’ government-to-government method 
for selling U.S. defense equipment, services, and train-
ing.) IMET’s goal is to improve the professionalism of 
foreign militaries. It is not, nor should it be, to provide 
discount rates to countries that can easily afford these 
services. We recommend that IMET be provided to only 
those countries with the greatest need and that the link 
between IMET and the purchase of training at dis-
counted rates be severed. 
All over the map: International  
Military Education and Training
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and curtailed assistance. As with economic assistance there is room for debate on 
our selections. We offer this illustrative approach in the hope that it leads to a more 
informed discussion of resource allocation.
Continued or expanded assistance
Within this category we identify priority investment countries and those for 
which we have limited expectations.
Priority investment countries should be given a higher priority for security assis-
tance than their current budget allocations because of their strategic importance, 
their need for such aid, and their capacity to achieve lasting stability. Decisions 
on security assistance need to be taken within a broader framework of effective 
governance and the probability that such assistance will contribute to stability and 
enhanced partnerships on security issues. 
As noted with economic assistance, priority is determined in relation to cur-
rent funding levels. So while Albania is ranked as a priority country and Egypt 
a limited expectations country, this is not to say Albania is more important than 
Egypt—simply that funding for Albania deserves a slight increase while Egypt 
should probably remain flat.
The 45 priority investment countries by region include: 
Priority investment countries
Africa
Benin; Botswana; Burkina Faso; Ghana; Kenya; Liberia; Mali*; Nigeria; 
Senegal; South Africa; South Sudan; Tanzania; Uganda; Zambia
East Asia and the Pacific Indonesia; Mongolia; Philippines; Thailand; Timor-Leste
Europe and Eurasia
Albania; Armenia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Georgia; Macedo-
nia; Moldova; Russia; Turkey
Near East Israel; Lebanon; Libya; Morocco; Tunisia; West Bank and Gaza
South and Central Asia Bangladesh; Kyrgyz Republic; Nepal
Western Hemisphere
Colombia; Dominican Republic; El Salvador; Guatemala; Honduras; 
Mexico; Panama; Peru
*We made this categorization prior to an attempted coup and military seizure of power in Mali. The lack of a democratically elected leader 
would affect our categorization of Mali and its associated funding levels. 
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Countries for which we have limited expectations will likely continue to receive 
significant assistance largely based on short-term imperatives, including security and 
other geopolitical concerns. But there are a number of red flags with the perfor-
mance of some of these governments. 
The 27 limited expectation countries by region include: 
Limited expectation countries
Africa
Burundi; Democratic Republic of Congo; Djibouti; Ethiopia; Gabon; 
Guinea; Mauritania; Mozambique; Rwanda; Sierra Leone; Somalia
East Asia and the Pacific Vietnam
Europe and Eurasia Azerbaijan; Kosovo; Ukraine
Near East Algeria; Egypt; Iraq; Jordan; Yemen
South and Central Asia Kazakhstan; Tajikistan
Western Hemisphere Bolivia; Ecuador; Haiti; Jamaica; Paraguay
Curtailed assistance
Within this category we identify countries that should be graduated from assis-
tance in the near term, those peripheral to U.S. security interests, and poor per-
forming countries.
Countries that should graduate in one to five years are those doing well enough to 
no longer rely on U.S. assistance. Inclusion in this category does not mean that other 
types of military-to-military or security cooperation should be neglected. 
The 30 countries that could graduate in one to five years include by region: 
Graduate in one to five years countries
Africa Mauritius; Namibia
East Asia and the Pacific China; Malaysia; Singapore; Taiwan
Europe and Eurasia
Croatia; Czech Republic; Estonia; Greece; Hungary; Latvia; Lithuania; Malta; 
Montenegro; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Serbia; Slovakia; Slovenia
Near East Oman
South and Central Asia India
Western Hemisphere
Argentina; The Bahamas; Barbados and Eastern Caribbean; Brazil; Chile; 
Costa Rica; Uruguay
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Countries peripheral to U.S. security interests often have small programs that call 
into question whether the level of funding will produce major results. Inclusion in 
this category is not a commentary on the country’s general willingness to cooper-
ate on security issues.
The 15 countries in the peripheral category by region include: 
Small, expensive to operate,  
or peripheral-interest country programs
Africa
Cape Verde; Central African Republic; Comoros; The Gambia; Lesotho; 
Malawi; Sao Tome and Principe; Seychelles; Togo
East Asia and the Pacific Marshall Islands; Samoa
Europe and Eurasia None
Near East None
South and Central Asia None
Western Hemisphere Belize; Guyana; Suriname; Trinidad and Tobago
Poor performing countries show little regard for governance and human rights. 
In many cases security assistance is merited for strategic considerations, but 
policymakers should be aware of the perverse effect of reinforcing undemocratic 
entrenched elites. Inclusion on this list does not mean all security aid should be 
cut but that there is room to reduce or revamp for better results.
The 17 poor performing countries by region include: 
Poor performing countries
Africa
Angola; Cameroon; Chad; Guinea-Bissau; Republic of Congo; Sudan; 
Swaziland
East Asia and the Pacific Cambodia; Laos
Europe and Eurasia None
Near East Bahrain
South and Central Asia Afghanistan; Maldives; Pakistan; Sri Lanka; Turkmenistan; Uzbekistan
Western Hemisphere Nicaragua
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Reform 2: Transition PEPFAR  
to country ownership
 
 
The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, or PEPFAR, is the largest 
commitment by any nation in history to combat a single disease, and U.S. gov-
ernment spending still constitutes a majority of global donor funding to combat 
HIV/AIDS. Most PEPFAR funds are dedicated to treatment, testing, and build-
ing up local health systems. 
PEPFAR is the elephant in the room when it comes to U.S. international assistance 
priorities because even though the fiscal year 2013 budget request for global health 
falls 3.8 percent below current levels, this remains the largest foreign aid account at 
$7.85 billion. The fiscal year 2013 request redirects some of the funding tradition-
ally directed toward PEPFAR to 
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria. The 
Global Fund, in contrast to 
PEPFAR, is a multilateral institu-
tion supported by a range of gov-
ernments and private donors. 
Between fiscal years 2004 and 
2012, the United States spent 
more than $38.6 billion on bilat-
eral HIV/AIDS programs, dwarf-
ing commitments in many other 
areas including funds dedicated 
to economic growth, agriculture, 
and the environment.
But it is equally clear that the need 
remains vast. More than 30 million 
people continue to live with the 
virus, the majority in sub-Saharan Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Africa where health systems are poor.18 PEPFAR has made an enormous difference, 
and the administration recently highlighted some important achievements:19 
•	 The United States directly supported life-saving antiretroviral treatment for 
more than 3.2 million men, women, and children worldwide as of September 
30, 2010, up from less than 2.5 million in 2009. The Obama administration has 
further pledged to put 6 million people on treatment globally by 2013. 
•	 PEPFAR directly supported antiretroviral prophylaxis to prevent mother-to-
child HIV transmission for more than 600,000 HIV-positive pregnant women in 
fiscal year 2010, resulting in more than 114,000 infants born HIV free.
•	 Through its partnerships with more than 30 countries, PEPFAR directly sup-
ported 11 million people with care, including nearly 3.8 million orphans and 
vulnerable children, in fiscal year 2010.
•	 PEPFAR directly supported HIV counseling and testing for nearly 33 million 
people in fiscal year 2010.
Debates about PEPFAR are often contentious and politically charged. Suggesting 
changes or alterations in the program is challenging because no one wants to appear 
less than fully committed to an effort that so clearly saves lives. Case in point: The 
administration’s proposal, as embodied in the 2013 budget request, to increase 
resources to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria while reduc-
ing direct funding to some PEPFAR countries received a mixed welcome. 
At the same time, PEPFAR may be unintentionally skewing broader development 
by focusing on a single disease. U.S. assistance dominates the health sector in the 
countries that receive the most PEPFAR funding, and it has proven challenging to 
figure out how best to secure lasting and sustainable development in key PEPFAR 
recipient countries while simultaneously combating HIV/AIDS.20 
The question for PEPFAR is how and at what speed the program can be converted 
from what is essentially an emergency humanitarian program—even though 
it was not always labeled as such—to a long-term and genuinely sustainable 
approach to health that fits within a broader development model. 
It was with this in mind that President Barack Obama announced the Global 
Health Initiative in 2009 with an emphasis on taking a more comprehensive 
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approach to health issues writ large. Middle-income countries would seem the 
logical place to start for sharing the financial load, but the administration did not 
specifically emphasize that approach. 
The 2008 reauthorization of PEPFAR also stressed the need to build more sustain-
able health outcomes and systems. This included plans to initiate Partnership 
Frameworks with PEPFAR partner countries to strengthen country capacity, own-
ership, and leadership of HIV/AIDS programs. These mutual nonbinding agree-
ments outline the expected arc of U.S. government support and how host-country 
investments and policy changes can position governments to assume primary 
responsibility for HIV/AIDS in the future.21 
Partnership Frameworks provide a five-year joint strategic outline for coopera-
tion between the U.S. government, the partner government, and other partners 
on service delivery, policy reform, and coordinated financial commitments. 
Within this timeframe, host countries will be better situated to control the 
management, strategic direction, performance monitoring, decision making, 
coordination, and, where possible, financial support and service delivery of their 
own HIV/AIDS programs. 
Frameworks are intended to be transparent, accountable, and open to participa-
tion from the civil society, the private sector, and international organizations that 
will help strengthen the capacity of governments to plan, oversee, manage, and 
ultimately finance national HIV/AIDS strategies.22 
To date, PEPFAR’s Partnership Framework discussions with South Africa are the 
most advanced and offer a model and lessons learned for how country owner-
ship and financial responsibility could be expanded in middle-income countries. 
(U.S. government investments in South Africa represent the largest single bilateral 
health account in the world, with the United States spending more than $3.1 bil-
lion on health issues in South Africa since 2004.)23
In preparation for an inevitable drawdown in U.S. funding, both governments are 
in the midst of negotiations to design a complex blueprint for a multiyear hand-
off that will see the South African government assume more of the financial and 
managerial burden of HIV/AIDS programs. 
It is also important to note that funding is not the only barometer of progress 
in addressing HIV/AIDS, and these partnerships can also look at how medical 
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advances, lower drug costs, public-private partnerships, less dependence on 
international organizations, and other efficiencies can bring down overall costs. 
PEPFAR operations will be aligned with South Africa’s national health system as 
the government gradually assumes the decision-making, planning, and financing 
responsibilities for its HIV/AIDS-related services. The forthcoming arrange-
ment should see the United States drawdown the direct provision of treatment 
and move toward more technical assistance while the South African govern-
ment works increasingly with a range of partners, including the U.S. government, 
through new service delivery arrangements. 
Over the next several years, the United States is expected to scale down its 
PEPFAR assistance to South Africa from its FY 2011 level of $535.3 million.24 
Encouragingly, the Zuma administration openly committed itself to delivering 
better health outcomes and made strides in scaling up health interventions such 
as male medical circumcision, HIV testing and counseling, and prevention of 
mother-to-child transmissions.25  
A recent Center for Strategic and International Studies , or CSIS, report suggests 
a drawdown to around $100 million to $200 million per year in U.S. support to 
South Africa at the conclusion of a multiyear transition to be feasible.26 PEPFAR 
bilateral funding for South Africa already edged down slightly since the framework 
was outlined in fiscal year 2010. 
The very useful CSIS study of the PEPFAR transition in South Africa noted 
that one of the key obstacles in the dialogue is the unwillingness or inability 
of U.S. negotiators to “lay down visible concrete milestones” in order to 
“align expectations, eliminate uncertainty, and minimize speculation and 
misunderstandings.”27 The authors argue that the sooner clear budget and 
policy targets are spelled out for the five-year transition period the better. 
Unfortunately most partnership frameworks signed in 2009-10 did not include 
any detailed budgetary information. 
We agree with the CSIS study and would like to see a more rigorous budget 
approach for other middle-income PEPFAR Partnership Framework countries. 
Much of the difficulty in the current approach stems from limited information on 
PEPFAR’s actual service delivery costs and the inability of the administration to 
make multiyear commitments under PEPFAR, thus inadvertently making burden 
sharing more difficult and uncertainty high. 
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The upcoming PEPFAR reauthorization could include clearer reporting on costs 
as well as multiyear transition funding that would benefit both the United States 
and PEPFAR recipients, and PEPFAR Partnership Frameworks could be con-
verted to something closer to a binding cash-on-delivery approach for countries 
performing at a good standard of quality.28
To date, PEPFAR has developed Partnership Frameworks with at least 21 
countries or regions. Of those, the World Bank classifies six as upper middle 
income: Botswana, Caribbean Regional, Central America Regional, Dominican 
Republic, Namibia, and South Africa. Eight Partnership Framework coun-
tries are classified as lower middle income: Angola, Ghana, Lesotho, Nigeria, 
Swaziland, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Zambia. 
Beginning with the upper-middle-income countries, the administration should 
update all frameworks to include clear annual budget and policy targets to allow 
for an orderly drawdown and eventual elimination of PEPFAR funding. These 
targets should be consistent with reasonable assumptions on available fiscal space, 
progress towards coverage goals, and capacity to retain current PEPFAR-funded 
service provision staff at local salaries. 
U.S. support to combat HIV/AIDS will remain invaluable, but ensuring support 
is sustainable will require recipient governments take on the bulk of direct service 
delivery costs, particularly with regard to treatment, testing, and maintaining local 
health systems, over time. And the recipient country’s ministries of finance—and 
perhaps parliamentary bodies—will need to anticipate and agree to planned pro-
grammatic and expenditure trajectories. 
In terms of funding targets for upper-middle-income countries, host countries 
should assume 60 percent to 80 percent of current PEPFAR service delivery obli-
gations and associated budget requirements by the fifth year of an agreement.29 
We recommend, however, that Partnership Frameworks carry out their own 
rigorous assessment of prospects for greater country co-financing of HIV/AIDS 
programs, taking into account possible efficiency reforms, co-financing criteria 
recently established by the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, 
and other donor plans going forward, as well as tradeoffs such as country 
governments reallocating funding for HIV/AIDS and away from other health 
areas or other spending. 
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Given the difficulties associated with a rapid shift in funding to HIV/AIDS, there 
are other strategies the administration could consider for low-income countries 
that may make an eventual transition to national funding more realistic over time, 
including a review of the non-service-delivery costs involved in PEPFAR, the 
degree to which the PEPFAR model relies on U.S. contractors, and the develop-
ment of active purchasing tools.
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Reform 3: Overhaul  
U.S. food assistance
 
 
The U.S. food aid program needs to be overhauled to improve responsiveness and 
effectiveness while holding down costs. Many of the laws and regulations that 
govern food aid are relics from the past—when U.S. farmers needed an outlet for 
surpluses—or are influenced by domestic interests in determining how U.S. com-
modities can be used or shipped. The fact that U.S. food assistance programs are 
badly flawed has long been an open secret, and the current drive for budget auster-
ity presents an ideal time to finally fix these clear dysfunctions.
A web of laws and regulations—cargo preference, limitations on local and regional 
purchase, and monetization—increase costs and reduce responsiveness. As a 
result, the Government Accountability Office estimates it takes an average of four 
to six months after the onset of a crisis for U.S. food aid to reach its final destina-
tion and that unnecessary transaction costs make food aid inefficient.30 
Drop cargo preference requirements
Since 1954 a cargo preference law has mandated that 75 percent of all U.S. food 
aid commodities be shipped aboard U.S. flagged vessels, or ships registered in 
the United States. The law was originally justified as a means to ensure available 
ships and crews during war, but it has since become an entitlement for U.S. ship-
pers with little or no military value. Indeed, many of these U.S. flagged vessels 
are actually foreign owned.31
The truth is that cargo preference serves no purpose other than to raise the cost of 
food aid and slow its timely delivery. The GAO estimates the law adds $200 mil-
lion annually in shipping costs, and a recent academic study concluded that cargo 
preference cost American taxpayers $140 million in unnecessary transportation 
costs in 2006. Further, the logistical cost of U.S. food aid shipments is 60 percent 
higher than our European counterparts, primarily because of cargo preference.32
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Cargo preference requirements also delay a timely U.S. response to food emergen-
cies. The need to align commodities with nearby ports that have willing and able 
U.S. ships can add unnecessary time when a quick response is essential. Instead 
contracts should be awarded to the lowest and most capable bidder. We recom-
mend that food aid be exempt from cargo preference requirements.
Expand local and regional purchase of food 
The United States provides about half of all global food aid annually. An inefficient 
U.S. system means that people suffer and the United States loses an opportunity to 
build goodwill. U.S. food aid funding increased by 53 percent from 2006 to 2008, 
but the tonnage of food delivered actually fell by 5 percent.33 While a portion of 
the tonnage decline was due to increased commodity costs, USAID also estimated 
that in 2006 nearly half of its food aid resources were allocated for transportation 
costs rather than actual food.34 
A logical conclusion is to purchase food closer to the emergency. A GAO report in 
2009 concluded that local and regional purchase would reduce costs by 25 percent 
and reduce delivery time from an average of 147 days to 41 days.35 
Buying more food closer to where it is needed is not a new idea. President George 
W. Bush proposed in four successive budgets to use up to 25 percent of P.L. 480, 
the main U.S. food program, for local and regional purchase as did his proposed 
2008 Farm Bill. But U.S. commodity groups, allied with shippers, pushed back 
and instead a minuscule pilot program with a required study was included that 
delayed any meaningful reform. With a growing number of lawmakers, aid orga-
nizations, and think tanks speaking out for food aid reform, however, real reform 
is now possible. We recommend that half of P.L. 480 be designated for local and 
regional purchase where appropriate for local conditions.
Eliminate monetization
Each year a portion of P.L. 480 funding is designated as “nonemergency,” which 
means private organizations can use those funds for agricultural development 
projects. Since 2001 nonemergency food aid totals roughly $400 million.  
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The problem is that the aid is still governed by cargo preference and “buy 
American” requirements. So the funds must be used to purchase U.S. 
commodities, which are then shipped on U.S.-flagged vessels and sold on local 
and regional markets. The proceeds can then be used to finance development 
projects or to help pay for the costs of distributing other food aid.
Development experts view monetization as counterproductive because when 
international NGOs sell agricultural products in local markets, it can depress 
prices for local farmers. It also increases NGO costs because they must retain 
procurement specialists who can manage bureaucratic transportation regulations 
and who can navigate local and regional markets. 
And a study chaired by former Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman and former 
head of the World Food Program Catherine Bertini reported that “monetized U.S. 
food aid typically generates only fifty to seventy cents of revenue on each taxpayer 
dollar spent.”36 So the sale of $400 million in food aid generates only between 
$200 million to $280 million for private development groups.
The transaction costs are so great and the development impact so limited that the 
well-respected international aid group CARE International announced in 2007 that 
it would no longer monetize aid because it was expensive to manage and did little for 
development. CARE noted: “Purchasing food in the U.S., shipping it overseas, and 
then selling it to generate funds for food security programs is far less cost effective 
than the logical alternative—simply providing cash to food security programs.”37  
At a minimum, we recommend that nonemergency food aid be exempt from 
both cargo preference and “buy American” requirements. Cost savings from these 
reforms would vary from year to year depending on fluctuations in food assis-
tance. We estimate, however, that efficiency gains would range from $488 mil-
lion to $628 million annually.38 Half of the saving from these reforms should be 
transferred to the Development Assistance account for agriculture-related grants 
to NGOs who formerly monetized.39 
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Reform 4: Create an international 
affairs realignment commission
 
 
Every major review of America’s foreign assistance programs over the last two 
decades—conducted by the widest range of actors imaginable—agrees on one 
fundamental point: The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which established 
USAID and set many of the rules of the road for how we deliver foreign assis-
tance, is badly outdated and needs to be rewritten.40 Its multiple problems are 
obvious to even casual observers and continue to considerably undermine 
America’s international engagement.
The act was passed in 1961, and since then it has been repeatedly amended, leav-
ing the legislation guiding assistance efforts convoluted, often self-contradictory, 
and badly out of sync with the demands of the modern world. Year after year the 
legislation has added new restrictions, earmarks, guidelines, prohibitions, pro-
grams, and directives with the net effect of creating an almost incoherent maze. 
Consequently, assistance efforts lack a sound framework. Almost all commenta-
tors agree that the national interest would be far better served by a more concise, 
cogent, and modern piece of controlling legislation.
This brings us to the second point of broad agreement on the Foreign Assistance 
Act: No one can figure out how to rewrite it. Indeed, rewriting the Foreign 
Assistance Act is the white whale of the foreign policy and development commu-
nity. Everyone thinks it should be done, but it is repeatedly dismissed as an impos-
sible goal. Major efforts to rewrite the legislation were undertaken consistently 
since a major revision in the early 1970s, but were largely stillborn. The 2000s saw 
the creation of PEPFAR and the Millennium Challenge Corporation, which were 
important milestones, but still not a coherent effort to reset assistance efforts.    
Washington’s rancorous environment only further hardens opinion that a Foreign 
Assistance Act rewrite would be impossible to achieve, as would broader restruc-
turing of the foreign affairs agencies. Certainly it is very difficult to envision a 
clean piece of authorizing legislation on restructuring the foreign affairs agencies 
emerging from the White House and Congress, with Congress divided, a Tea 
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Party faction within Republican ranks that objects to assistance efforts as a rule, 
rampant special interest lobbying, and sharp divides about foreign policy.
Sadly, the repeated failures of Foreign Assistance Act rewrites largely convinced 
administrations regardless of their party that they can only institute reforms 
that avoid the need for new underlying legislation. So the first-ever Quadrennial 
Diplomacy and Development Review the Obama administration released in 
December 2010, for example, spelled out an ambitious series of reforms at both 
State and USAID, yet very consciously shied away from tackling issues that would 
require major pieces of new legislation. This approach leaves the United States 
merely tinkering around the edges of the problem without getting to its heart.   
The current authorization process’s limits were further underscored when 
President Obama announced in January 2012 that he was seeking expedited 
authority from Congress to streamline existing government bureaucracy. In this 
specific case, President Obama is hoping to merge the Commerce Department’s 
core business and trade functions, the Small Business Administration, the Office 
of the U.S. Trade Representative, the Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation, and the Trade and Development Agency into a single 
new department whose mission is “helping American businesses succeed.” The 
president suggested that such streamlining would save $3 billion over 10 years but 
he did not detail the specific cost savings.41  
The president, in announcing his plans and asking for expedited authority to 
streamline agencies, noted that the executive branch enjoyed such authority from 
a period that began in the middle of the Great Depression and ended during 
President Ronald Reagan’s term in 1984. Under this authority the president could 
streamline and consolidate executive branch functions and institutions by putting 
such proposals to Congress in a straight up-or-down vote.   
The president’s proposal on merging the trade entities has merit. While the six 
entities involved in this streamlining proposal have both trade and development 
functions, merging them together would be a step toward greater coherence and 
coordination in this arena. Congress’s initial response to the president’s request for 
greater streamlining authority was measured and could enjoy bipartisan support 
given the need for cost savings.  
Beyond the president’s proposal for expedited authority to streamline agencies, 
however, there is another much more far-reaching alternative to move beyond the 
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long history of repeated impasse. It will create much more effective assistance pro-
grams, modernize the entire U.S. foreign policy structure, and allow cuts across the 
150 account to be managed much more effectively during the next administration. 
Our recommendation is that the administration and Congress embrace an 
approach modeled on the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 
or BRAC. BRAC was created to deal with an equally difficult political challenge: 
The Department of Defense knew it needed to close and realign bases to bring 
the presence of its facilities in line with its strategic goals. Yet the decision to close 
individual bases was wrenching and sparked very intense localized opposition. 
By creating an outside commission, the Pentagon was able to bundle closures 
together, make clear these determinations were made on the basis of real strategic 
need and not lobbying, and present the list of closures for a clear up-or-down vote. 
BRAC rounds were in 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 2005, and the BRAC commis-
sion was incredibly effective in turning what was one of the hottest lightning-rod 
issues in Washington into a fairly routine process.   
Rather than focus on physical installations, as BRAC did, an international affairs 
realignment commission would have the writ to not only look at the physical pres-
ence of U.S. embassies, consulates, and USAID missions but more importantly 
identify regulations , programs, and projects that could be eliminated, or even 
recommend institutional consolidation or streamlining. 
Setting the exact mandate for the commission’s first round would be essential, 
and one of the reasons BRAC succeeded was because it had the ability to identify 
major issues to be addressed without overloading the system and having it try to 
overhaul all base structure issues in one fell swoop. 
In its first round, for example, an International Affairs Realignment Commission 
might review USAID mission’s presence around the globe, the relationship 
between America’s trade promotion efforts, or how the responsibilities for com-
plex emergencies and humanitarian relief are divided between State and USAID. 
But bringing America’s foreign affairs agencies into the modern era will clearly 
require several rounds by such a commission, and advocates of more effective 
diplomacy and development efforts need to recognize that we will only be able to 
improve diplomacy and development to a limited degree unless we are willing to 
tackle the broader question of the system under which they operate.
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Like the BRAC process, international affairs realignment commissioners would 
be appointed by the president in consultation with Congress. The commissioners 
would base their recommendations on the broad strategic guidance established 
through the QDDR (which spells out the key policy and organizational challenges 
facing the foreign affairs agencies), and through subsequent discussions with 
commissioners. Also like BRAC, key stakeholders could give input. Finally, the 
commission process would allow for major parts of the Foreign Assistance Act to 
be updated and rewritten in a streamlined process that respected the prerogatives 
of both Congress and the executive branch. 
The president could accept or reject the commission’s recommendations in their 
entirety. If rejected, the commission would have a set period to amend and resub-
mit. Congress would have the opportunity to reject the report or else it becomes 
law. The benefits of such a process would be manifold: 
•	 Move forward with important restructuring efforts in foreign affairs, abolish 
numerous regulations and constraints that accumulated over the years, and 
achieve significant cost savings without employing the traditional authorization 
process that has very clearly broken down
•	 Substantially reduce or eliminate outdated spending mandates and earmarks
•	 Significantly modernize the U.S. foreign policy architecture—something that 
will well serve the national interest and presidents regardless of party
•	 Package reforms together as a coherent bipartisan whole for an up-or-down vote 
with a high likelihood of making it through Congress
•	 Assure that both Congress and the president can reject the commission’s recom-
mendations if they don’t agree 
It would cost money to establish such a commission, but its operations would 
more than pay for themselves in the long run and should ultimately produce 
significant cost savings.
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Conclusion
 
 
Periods of austerity bring hard choices. The federal budget crunch we face over the 
next decade is no exception. By almost any sane measure, we need to reduce the 
deficit while still ensuring that we protect and advance our core national interests. 
This is as true in foreign affairs as it is in domestic.
The stakes in properly managing this endeavor are enormous and will speak to our 
credibility as a leader in the community of nations and as a country that remains 
committed to its founding principles and vision.
The reforms suggested in this report—embracing selectivity with our economic 
and security assistance, more rapidly transitioning PEPFAR to country ownership 
in middle-income countries, overhauling food aid programs, and establishing an 
international affairs realignment commission—all require breaking from the sta-
tus quo. But all would yield considerable savings while making our international 
engagement more effective. 
Some of these ideas will be labeled controversial or adamantly opposed in certain 
quarters. To those who disagree, we offer a simple challenge: Put a better plan on the 
table. If the only suggestion is to keep business as usual, to pretend that real budget 
cuts can be avoided in perpetuity, or to claim that compromise or consensus are 
simply too difficult to achieve, then that is surely a premature admission of defeat.
The United States has an important window of opportunity to reform how it orga-
nizes and conducts its affairs abroad. It should not be missed. 
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Glossary
 
 
Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia: The Assistance for Europe, 
Eurasia, and Central Asia, or AEECA, account in the international affairs budget 
supports U.S. efforts to stabilize and transition Southeastern Europe and the 
independent states of the former Soviet Union to stable, pluralistic, and prosper-
ous countries. AEECA is proposed for elimination in the fiscal year 2013 budget 
request in recognition of a number of countries’ progress toward Euro-Atlantic 
integration and the need to support other foreign assistance priorities globally.
Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission: The Base Realignment and 
Closure Commission, or BRAC, was established to deal with the politically con-
tentious issue of closing military bases to achieve efficiencies and savings in line 
with congressional and Department of Defense objectives. The president appoints 
the independent nine-member panel, which submits its recommendations to 
Congress for approval. BRAC rounds took place in 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 
2005, and new rounds are still possible. Over five rounds the BRAC successfully 
closed 350 military installations. 
Development assistance: The development assistance account in the interna-
tional affairs budget refers to specific economic assistance USAID provides for 
long-term development activities. Development assistance supports multi-sector 
programs related to food security, education, economic growth, climate change, 
and governance, among others, with a focus on achieving the United Nations’ 
Millennium Development goals. 
Discretionary programs: These programs have their funding determined every 
year through the federal appropriations process. This spending is optional in 
contrast to entitlement programs, which are mandatory. Discretionary programs 
include development assistance. 
Doing Business Index 2012: A co-publication of the World Bank and the 
International Finance Corporation, the Doing Business rankings provide objective 
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measures of business regulations and their enforcement across 183 economies. 
Economies are ranked on their ease of doing business, from 1 to 183. A lower 
ranking on the ease of doing business index means the regulatory environment 
is more conducive to the starting and operation of a local firm. This index 
averages the country’s percentile rankings on 10 topics made up of a variety of 
indicators, giving equal weight to each topic. The rankings for all economies are 
benchmarked to June 2011.
Economic assistance: For the purposes of this report, economic assistance is 
defined as the following Function 150 bilateral accounts the U.S. government 
allocates: Development Assistance; Global Health Programs; Economic Support 
Fund; Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia; and the nonemergency 
portions of Food for Peace. 
Economic Support Fund: Congress established the Economic Support Fund 
account in the international affairs budget to promote economic and political 
stability in regions where the United States has special security interests. The 
Department of State and USAID co-manage the Economic Support Fund and 
while its funds can support development activities its primary purpose is to sup-
port strategically important countries that might not otherwise qualify for aid.
Food for Peace: The Food for Peace account in the international affairs budget 
authorizes the provision of U.S. food assistance in response to emergencies and 
disasters around the world, and also funds nonemergency, development-oriented 
resources to help address the underlying causes of food insecurity. Funds are 
appropriated to the U.S. Department of Agriculture and administered by USAID.  
Food monetization: Under food-aid regulation, USAID is allowed to have private 
voluntary organizations sell a portion of the food aid they receive from the United 
States on local markets in or near needy countries, and then use the proceeds of 
these sales to finance development projects or help pay for the costs of distribut-
ing other food aid. Some organizations have come to rely on this sale of food aid 
as a significant source of revenue. 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961: The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is the main 
legislative framework for U.S. foreign assistance and the cornerstone of all U.S. 
aid policies and programs. Congress has regularly updated the Foreign Assistance 
Act through reauthorizations since 1961, but the latest revision occurred in 1985. 
Written, passed, and signed into law at what some consider the height of the Cold 
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War, the act is seen by many today as outdated and unreflective of the current 
U.S. foreign assistance structure. Attempts have been made to revise the act, but 
moving foreign aid legislation through both the House and Senate has become 
increasingly problematic. 
Foreign Military Financing: The Foreign Military Financing account in the inter-
national affairs budget provides grants for the acquisition of U.S. defense equip-
ment, services, and training. It is intended to promote U.S. national security by 
contributing to regional and global stability, strengthening military support for 
democratically elected governments, and containing transnational threats includ-
ing terrorism and trafficking in narcotics, weapons, and persons.
Freedom in the World Freedom Status 2011: Freedom in the World is a compara-
tive assessment of global political rights and civil liberties published annually 
since 1972 by Freedom House, a nonprofit supporting democratic change and 
advocating for democracy and human rights worldwide. The survey rates and 
reports on 195 countries and 14 related and disputed territories to monitor trends 
in democracy and track improvements and setbacks in freedom worldwide.
Function 150 account: The majority of U.S. foreign assistance is contained in the 
international affairs budget requested and allocated through the State, Foreign 
Operations, and Related Agencies appropriations bill. This is also referred to as 
Function 150 or the “150 account” and contains spending on global economic, 
diplomatic, and humanitarian programs by the State Department, USAID, and the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation, among others. 
Global Environmental Facility: The Global Environment Facility, or GEF, unites 
182 member governments to address global environmental issues. The GEF pro-
vides grants to developing countries and countries with economies in transition 
for projects related to biodiversity, climate change, international waters, land deg-
radation, the ozone layer, and persistent organic pollutants. Established in 1991, 
the GEF is today the largest funder of projects to improve the global environment.
Global Health Programs: The Global Health Programs, formerly known as the 
Global Health and Child Survival account in the international affairs budget, was 
first appropriated in FY 2008 to merge the funds formerly appropriated under the 
Child Survival Health fund account and the Global HIV/AIDS Initiative account. 
Child Survival Health funded child survival, maternal health, HIV/AIDS, vulner-
able children, family planning, and infectious diseases activities. The Global HIV/
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AIDS Initiative was a separate appropriation used to fund the primary activities in 
the 15 focus countries under the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief as well 
as provide funds for central programs and limited funding for nonfocus programs. 
Global Health Initiative: The Global Health Initiative, or GHI, is an integrated 
approach to global health that leverages U.S. investments to improve health 
worldwide. GHI strengthens health systems with a focus on healthier women and 
families, innovation, partnerships, and country ownership. GHI aims to maximize 
the sustainable health impact the United States achieves for every dollar invested 
including through PEPFAR, the President’s Malaria Initiative, and maternal and 
child health investments. Additionally, the Obama administration identified eight 
countries as GHI “Plus” countries, entitling them to additional technical and man-
agement assistance to accelerate the transition to GHI principles. 
Global Partnership for Education: Established in 2002 the Global Partnership for 
Education is comprised of 46 developing countries, and over 30 bilateral, regional, 
and international agencies, development banks, the private sector, teachers, and local 
and global civil society groups. The Global Partnership for Education aims to pro-
vide its developing country partners the incentives, resources, and technical support 
to build and implement sound education plans. Partnership members mobilize and 
coordinate resources to support the achievement of these plans’ targets. 
Gross national income per capita: Gross national income, or GNI, per capita is 
a country’s gross national income converted to U.S. dollars using the World Bank 
Atlas method, divided by the midyear population. To smooth fluctuations in prices 
and exchange rates, the World Bank uses a special Atlas method of conversion. We 
use the World Bank’s World Development Indicators as the source for GNI.
Human Development Index 2011: Developed through the United Nations 
Development Programme, the Human Development Index is a single statistic that 
combines life expectancy, educational attainment, and income into a compos-
ite index. The index serves as a frame of reference for both social and economic 
development within a given country.
International Military and Education Training: The International Military and 
Education Training account in the international affairs budget is an instrument of 
U.S. national security and foreign policy that provides training on a grant basis to 
students from allied and friendly nations.
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International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement: The International 
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement, or INCLE, account in the international 
affairs budget supports country and global programs critical to combating transna-
tional crime and illicit threats—including efforts against terrorist and other crimi-
nal networks involved in the illegal drug trade—as well as other illicit enterprises. 
INCLE programs seek to close the gaps between law enforcement jurisdictions 
and to strengthen weak or corrupt law enforcement institutions.
Military expenditure as a percent of GDP: This indicator reveals the relative 
amount of funding each country spends on security. Military expenditures include 
all current and capital expenditures on the armed forces; defense ministries and 
other government agencies engaged in defense projects; paramilitary forces, if 
these are judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and military 
space activities. We use the World Bank’s World Development Indicators as the 
source for this indicator.
Millennium Challenge Corporation: The Millennium Challenge Corporation, or 
MCC, is an independent U.S. foreign aid agency seeking to reduce poverty through 
economic growth in a select number of poor, well-governed countries. The MCC 
provides grants known as “compacts” to well-governed countries.  Compacts span 
five years and range in the hundreds of millions of dollars. The MCC also has a 
threshold program that provides smaller, shorter grants to countries on the cusp of 
compact eligibility. The MCC model is distinctive for its competitive country selec-
tion, commitment to country ownership, and focus on results and impact.
Net foreign direct investment: Foreign direct investment is the net inflow of 
investment to acquire a lasting management interest in an enterprise operating in an 
economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment 
of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance 
of payments. This indicator shows net inflows (new investment inflows less disin-
vestment) in the reporting economy from foreign investors in current U.S. dollars 
and we use the World Bank’s World Development Indicators as the source.
Net official development assistance per capita: Net official development 
assistance per capita consists of disbursements of loans made on concessional 
terms and grants by members of the Development Assistance Committee, 
or DAC, of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
multilateral institutions, and non-DAC countries to promote economic 
development. It is calculated by dividing net official development assistance by 
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the midyear population estimate. Data are in current U.S. dollars and we use the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators as the source for this number.
Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and related programs: The 
Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and related programs account in the 
international affairs budget supports U.S. efforts in four areas: nonproliferation, 
antiterrorism, regional stability, and humanitarian assistance. These programs are 
meant to reduce transnational threats to America’s security, as well as to mitigate 
local threats that cause regional instabilities and humanitarian tragedies.
Operating expenses: In this report operating expenses or operational expenses are 
the ongoing cost of running the normal operations of USAID, such as budgeting 
for employee salaries. 
Peacekeeping Operations: The Peacekeeping Operations account in the inter-
national affairs budget supports multilateral peacekeeping and regional stability 
operations not funded through the United Nations. Funds also address key gaps 
to enable countries and regional organizations to participate in peacekeeping, 
humanitarian operations, counterterrorism operations, and reform security forces 
in the aftermath of conflict.
Presidential Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief: President George W. Bush launched 
the Presidential Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief in 2003 to help provide preven-
tion, treatment, and care services to countries suffering high HIV/AIDS infec-
tions. The initiative represents the largest health commitment by one country to 
combat a single disease internationally. 
President’s Policy Directive on Global Development: Signed on September 22, 
2010 the President’s Policy Directive on Global Development is the first presi-
dential directive to focus on development and recognize it as vital to U.S. national 
security and a strategic, economic, and moral imperative for the United States. 
After nearly a year of study involving all U.S. government agencies engaged in 
some type of foreign assistance or development work, the directive outlined a 
number of principles to guide U.S. global development.  
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review: Released on December 
15, 2010 the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, or QDDR, 
set out the blueprint for U.S. international assistance and diplomacy with the 
goal of making both development and diplomacy more effective, efficient, 
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and accountable. The QDDR seeks to strengthen the use of civilian power—
diplomacy and development—to advance national interests. 
Security assistance: For the purposes of this report, we define security assistance 
as Foreign Military Financing; International Military Education and Training; 
Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; International 
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; Peacekeeping Operations; and Pakistan 
Counterinsurgency Capability Fund accounts in the State and Foreign Operations 
appropriations bill. The State Department oversees this assistance, though the 
Defense Department carries out the actual provision of some of this assistance 
and training. This report does not include military assistance budgeted purely 
through the Pentagon because it is not a component of the 150 account.
The Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction: The Budget Control Act 
established the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction (the “super commit-
tee”), which was charged with recommending ways to reduce the deficit by up to 
$1.2 trillion over 10 years. According to the Budget Control Act, if the committee 
or Congress fails to pass a law that reduces deficits by at least $1.2 trillion, then a 
sequestration—or across-the-board spending cuts—will be triggered in January 
2013 and continue for nine years. 
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2011: The Corruption 
Perceptions Index ranks almost 200 countries based on how corrupt their public 
sector is perceived to be. A country’s score indicates the perceived level of public-
sector corruption on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means a country is perceived as 
highly corrupt and 10 means a country is perceived as very clean. A country’s rank 
indicates its position relative to the other countries included in the index.
Trilateral assistance: The concept of trilateral cooperation—understood in its 
basic form as a partnership among a traditional donor, an emerging donor, and a 
low-income country—is a relatively new form of foreign assistance engagement. 
Although the idea has been around since 2005 and already represents a growing 
share of south-to-south cooperation, it has not gained much currency in U.S. aid 
programs until recently where some types of trilateralism are being tried in South 
Africa and Latin America. 
Universal diplomatic representation: The commitment to preserve U.S. diplo-
matic ties with all or near all countries in the world by maintaining in-country 
embassies and diplomats in every country. 
Worldwide Governance Indicators: The Worldwide Governance Indicators 
project reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for 213 economies 
for six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability; political stability and 
absence of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and 
control of corruption. The aggregate indicators combine the views of a large num-
ber of enterprise, citizen, and expert survey respondents in industrial and develop-
ing countries. The individual data sources underlying the aggregate indicators are 
drawn from a diverse variety of survey institutes, think tanks, nongovernmental 
organizations, and international organizations. This report uses the government 
effectiveness and rule of law indicators.
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and made bold recommendations for mechanisms, structures and 
incentives to empower recipients and meet U.S. national security 
and foreign policy goals and objectives. The bipartisan commission 
achieved consensus on many areas of reform, including the need to 
rewrite the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to establish a new com-
pact on foreign assistance. See: HELP Commission, “Beyond Assis-
tance: The HELP Commission Report on Foreign Assistance Reform” 
(2007), available at http://www.helpcommission.info/Beyond%20
Assistance%20-%20HELP%20Commission%20Report%20FInAL.pdf. 
41   White House, “Remarks by the President on government Reform,” 
Press release, January 13, 2012, available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/2012/01/13/remarks-president-government-
reform.
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